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L Introduction
As early as 1789, Benjamin Franklin astutely commented, "In this
world, nothing is certain but death and taxes."' Or, as is now the case, the
two are one and the same: you die, and you are taxed at your death. This
belief has been the central motivator for the recent push for Congress to
repeal the estate tax permanently. Currently, a phase-out process is in effect
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that will culminate in a one year repeal.2 Repeal proponents want to extend
this repeal indefinitely and have sparked a nation-wide debate that has
jumped to the top of the political agenda.3
The movement for repeal has been led by creative groups who know
how to manipulate voters by disseminating incorrect information.
Americans are particularly susceptible to manipulation when it comes to
taxes in general. Taxpayers rarely have a good understanding of the tax
code, but still harbor strong feelings about this "necessary evil. ',4 Indeed,
even the name of the estate tax has been twisted to gamer support for repeal
proponents - the "death tax." "Estate tax sounds like it only hits the wealthy,
but "death tax" sounds like it hits everyone.... You don't have to be really
rich to be worried about a death tax." 5 As a Washington journalist put it, the
repeal advocates had a winning formula: "[c]all it the death tax and make it
appear that many more people have to pay it than actually do, appeal to the
Republican anti-tax sentiment and make it a moral issue, and spread the
gospel to politically powerful constituents" who are not affected by the tax
nearly as much as they believe, if at all.6 A poll done in 1999 by the
Americans Against Unfair Family Taxation showed that 77 percent of
taxpayers believed the estate tax affects all Americans, far below the 2
percent who are actually subject to the estate tax.7 In reality, approximately
99 percent of estates pay $0 in estate taxes.8
2 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§
511(c)(2)(B), 521(a), 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2001(c)(1)-(2), 2010(c)) [hereinafter
EGTRRA].
3 See Donald G. Carlson, PwC Submits Summary of 2006 Legislative Outlook, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Jan. 19, 2006, at 12-14, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT ("Congress also is expected to continue
consideration of... permanent estate tax repeal......."); see also Keith W. Lantz, A. Lee Gurley IH &
Kenneth W. Linna, Popular Support for the Elimination of Estate Taxes in the United States?, 99 TAX
NOTES TODAY, May 26, 2003, at 1263, available at LEXIS, 2003 TNT (introducing the EGTRRA and its
appearance on the nation's political agenda); Board Briefing, Council on Founds., Federal Estate Tax-
Should it be eliminated or retained?, 1 (April 2001) available at
http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/Goveming-Boards/bb3estatetax.pdf (discussing the estate tax
debate).
4 See J. SCoTT MOODY, WENDY P. WARCHOLIK & ScoTr A. HODGE, TAX FOUNDATION
SPECIAL REPORT: THE RISING COST OF COMPLYING WITH THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1 (Dec. 2005),
http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/054c1788c5389208f4608b195a6ff302.pdf (noting that the increasing
complexity of the tax code has made the cost of compliance increase); see also AMITY SHLAES, THE
GREEDY HAND: How TAXES DRIVE AMERICANS CRAZY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (1999) (discussing
public opinion regarding taxes in the context of withholding).
5 See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 77 (2005) (quoting a "key staffer to a high-ranking congressional
Republican").
6 Id. at 78 (quoting a "prominent Washington journalist").
Id. at 125.
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, THE ESTATE TAX: MYTHS AND REALITIES (2006),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/estatetaxmyths.pdf [hereinafter MYTHS AND REALITIES].
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The identity of those individuals who support permanent repeal is in
some respects easily predictable, and in other respects a surprise. Alongside
the predicable support of wealthy white taxpayers, blacks of all income
levels have been encouraged to support repeal.9 While all classes and races
have been encouraged to support repeal, the support from black individuals
is perplexing, because black taxpayers are disproportionately poor and will
therefore be hit the hardest by the repercussions that will occur if the estate
tax is repealed. It is most likely that this group's support springs from
incorrect perceptions of the estate tax. Politicians and other repeal
proponents have proliferated misinformation and have deluded most
taxpayers, including the nation's black minority population, into thinking
that the repeal of the estate tax is a good thing.' ° Playing upon the misbelief
that all Americans are affected by the estate tax and casting the tax in a
negative light, estate tax opponents have led blacks to believe that estate tax
repeal will benefit them as a class. Unfortunately, while the misinformation
has kept most of the national population blind to the real effects of estate tax
repeal, those effects will have a particularly negative effect on the black
population as a whole.
Part II of this Note introduces the federal estate tax: providing its
background and subsequent changes, as well as the policy rationales behind
its creation and evolution. Part I discusses the negative effects of repeal in
five key areas. The first effect is that the concentrations of wealth among the
nation's richest individuals will increase. Second, the government's revenue
will decrease and will have to be made up from alternative sources. Third,
the progressivity of the nation's tax system-the system's keystone-will be
severely damaged, if not eliminated. Fourth, like the federal government, the
states will lose substantial amounts of revenue and will be forced to
compensate for this loss on their own. Finally, charities will likely suffer as
taxpayer incentive for charitable gifts and bequests would be eliminated by
an estate tax repeal. Part IV explains how these effects of repeal are likely to
have a disproportionate effect on blacks and will widen the already vast
9 Harry C. Afford, President & CEO, National Black Chamber of Commerce, Editorial, Blacks
Should Help in Doing Away With the "DEATH TAX,"
http://www.nationalbcc.org/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=77&Itemid= (last visited
Nov. 12, 2006); see also Joshua Green, Black Death, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (June 4, 2001) (noting
the advertisements run by estate tax supporters in newspapers, claiming the tax discriminates against
blacks and urging its repeal).
10 See Green, supra note 9 (laying out the falsehoods about the estate tax that have been used by
politicians to gamer black support); see also Gary Bass, Ellen Taylor & Cate Paskoff, Race Poverty and
the Estate Tax, POVERTY & RACE NEWSLM-MR (Poverty & Race Research Action Council, D.C.),
September/October 2002, available at
http://www.prrac.orgfull-text.php?textid=767&item-id=7799&newsletter-id=64&headerSeptember/O
ctober%202002%20Newsletter (claiming that the argument that the estate tax hurts the black community
is false).
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economic gap between whites and blacks in this nation. It will go on to
describe why, despite these harmful effects, blacks have been among the
supporters of the repeal movement. Part V proposes a compromise between
repealing the estate tax and returning it to its prior form. This proposal is
designed to serve the needs of the government while protecting the interests
of blacks as a group.
II. What is the Federal Estate Tax?
The estate tax, more recently known as the "death tax"" is an excise
tax, rather than a direct tax,12 imposed on the privilege to transfer one's
property at death.' 3 The tax is measured by the size of the decedent's gross
estate at death, which generally includes all the property the decedent owned,
plus all property in which the decedent possessed incidents of ownership, or
exercised control of at death, less any allowed deductions.' 4 In 2004, estate
taxpayers deducted $87 billion from their estate taxes.' 5 Deductions include
administrative costs, such as debts belonging to the decedent at his death and
funeral expenses paid by the estate, 16 estate casualty losses, 17 a marital
deduction for a surviving spouse,' 8 charitable deductions, 9 and a deduction
for certain family-owned businesses. 20 Finally, the net estate tax is computed
by subtracting the unified transfer tax credit2' and other credits22 from the
gross estate.
n The nickname is used to describe the Federal Estate Tax because it is imposed when the
taxpayer dies. It was coined by Jim Martin, President of seniors' organization 60 Plus. William J. Murray,
THE CHAIRMAN'S ACTION REPORT (Religious Freedom Coalition, D.C.), March 9, 2006, at 2, available at
http://rfcnet.org/pdfs/pdf2OO6/06fO4intemet.pdf.
12 An excise tax is a tax applied to transfers of property, as opposed to a direct tax, which is
applied to the property itself.
13 See Debra Rahmin Silberstein, A History of the Death Tax: A Source of Revenue, or a Vehicle
for Wealth Redistribution?, PROBATE & PROPERTY, May/June 2003, at 58 (defining the "death tax").
14 I.R.C. § 2001(b) (2005).
15 JANE G. GRAVELLE & STEVEN MAGUIRE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES: ECONOMIC ISSUES, 3 (2006).
16 I.R.C. § 2053(a) (2005). This is the most prevalent deduction, totaling $483 million in 2004.
GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 3.
17 I.R.C. § 2054 (2005) (provided such losses are not deducted for income tax purposes (I.R.C. §
642(g) (2005)).
is I.R.C. § 2056 (2005). The most valuable of the estate tax deductions, totaling $59.9 billion in
2004. GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 3.
19 I.R.C. § 2055 (2005).
20 I.R.C. § 2057 (2005) (deduction permitted for closely held business interests).
21 I.R.C. §2010 (2005). The Unified Transfer Tax Credit, provided under I.R.C. § 2010 is the
amount that equals the I.R.C. § 2001(c) tax on the "applicable exclusion amount," established under I.R.C.
§ 2010(c). In 2006, the applicable exclusion amount is $2 million dollars, which results in a credit of
$555,800, subject to the limitation under I.R.C. § 2010(d) that the amount of the credit shall not exceed
the amount of the tax imposed.
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A. History of the Estate Tax
This is not the first time the estate tax has found its way into the
national spotlight or been the subject of political controversy. The notion of
an estate tax was created by the Egyptians and later adopted by the Greeks
and Romans. 3 The concept first appeared in the United States in 1797 in the
form of a legacy tax in order to generate revenue to construct a navy.24 The
tax consisted of stamp duties, a stamp that was placed upon letters of probate
when an inheritor took possession of the deceased's property at his death.25
This early estate tax was imposed on all testamentary dispositions, descents,
and successions to the estate of intestates, excepting those to parents,
husbands, wives, or lineal descendants.26 The tax was repealed in 1802 and
not replaced again until 1862, when Congress designed new estate taxes to
raise revenue for the Civil War.27 This time, an inheritance tax was levied
against each legacy or distributive share, and a probate duty was charged
against the entire estate.28 By 1864, the tax applied to both personal and real
property and remained in effect until 1870, when the Civil War had passed
and the need for the revenue had ceased.29
The next estate and inheritance tax was enacted by Congress in
1898, again to raise government revenue for military spending. 30 The
determination of the amount of the tax was based on the size of the estate and
the relationship between the decedent and the inheritor.3' Like today's estate
tax, any legacies passing to the decedent's spouse were exempt from the
1898 tax. 32 Shortly after its enactment, the constitutionality of the 1898 tax
22 Other credits whose function is to avoid or lessen the possibility of "double" taxation include
the credit for state death taxes under I.R.C. § 2011, the credit for pre-1977 gift tax on gifts included in the
gross estate under I.R.C. § 2012, the credit for estate tax on prior transfers of decedent under I.R.C. §
2013, and the credit for foreign death taxes under I.R.C. § 2014.
23 See Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAx L. REv. 223, 223 (1956)
(explaining the origin of the modem estate tax).
24 Silberstein, supra note 13, at 59 (introducing the emergence of the estate tax in the United
States) (citing DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS (2001)).
25 Id.
26 Id. (discussing the imposition of the predecessor to today's estate tax) (citing Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 50 (1900)).
27 Id. (tracing the estate tax through the first half of the 19th century) (citing JOHN K. MCNULTY,
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION 1 (5th ed., 1994)); see also Jerry J. McCoy, Charitable Planning
in the Post-Estate-Tax Era, TAX MANAGEMENT ESTATES, GiFrS AND TRUSTS JOURNAL, 2001, at 70
(discussing the emergence of the precursor to the modem estate tax).
28 See Silberstein, supra note 13, at 59 (noting the changes in the estate tax during the Civil War)
(citing Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 50 (1900)).
29 Id.
30 Id. (indicating that the estate tax correlated with times of war); see also McCoy, supra note 27,
at 70 (explaining that the need for revenue for the Spanish American War led to the enactment of the 1898
death tax).
31 See Silberstein, supra note 13, at 59 (explaining the methods for estate tax imposition in 1898).
32 Id.
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was challenged in Knowlton v. Moore.33  The case rose to the Supreme
Court, which found the tax constitutional by characterizing the tax as an
excise tax (as opposed to a direct tax), which only requires that the tax be
applied uniformly.34 Despite the ruling, however, Congress repealed the tax
in 1902. 35
In 1916 the direct ancestor of today's federal estate tax was enacted,
both to help defray the cost of military preparedness for World War I and to
36 t
break up concentrations of wealth created through inheritance. In order to
justify the new tax, the House of Representatives' Committee on Ways and
Means stated that "a new type of tax was needed, because the consumption
taxes in effect at that time bore most heavily upon those least able to pay
them.' 37 Congress intended to balance the revenue system equitably and to
collect more revenue from those with a greater ability to pay.38 As before,
the constitutionality of the federal estate tax was challenged and upheld in
the Supreme Court case New York Trust Co. v. Eisner.39
As time passed, the original estate tax was subject to changes and
additions. In 1924, in response to taxpayer manipulation and avoidance,
Congress enacted the federal credit for state death transfers and also enacted
33 See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (finding the estate tax of 1898 constitutional).
The constitutionality of the 1898 estate tax was challenged on the grounds that it was a direct tax, which
must be apportioned between the states in proportion to the state's population as required by Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution (the Direct Tax Clause), that the tax was administered in a manner that
treated the states unequally. Id. at 44-45. The Court evaluated whether the tax was direct by
"ascertain[ing] whether the one upon whom by law the burden of paying it is first cast, can thereafter shift
it to another person. If he cannot, the tax would then be direct in the constitutional sense." Id. at 81-82.
The Court determined that the tax was not a direct tax by evaluating its traditional use. The Court found
that the tax was traditionally considered an excise tax because "death is the generating source from which
the particular taxing power takes its being and that it is the power to transmit, or the transmission from the
dead to the living, on which such taxes are more immediately rested," and the tax therefore be apportioned
unequally between the states. Id. at 56.
34 See Silberstein, supra note 13, at 59 (discussing the Court's reasoning in Knowlton v. Moore).
35 Id. at 60; see also McCoy, supra note 27, at 70 (noting the reasons for repeal despite the
Supreme Court's finding that the 1898 tax was constitutional).
36 See Silberstein, supra note 13, at 60 (discussing the origin of the direct precursor to today's
estate tax) (citing JOHN K. MCNULTY, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 3 (5th ed., 1994)); see also
McCoy, supra note 13, at 70 ("The government's revenue needs for World War I led Congress to enact
the modern estate tax in 1916, with rates ranging from a 1 percent to 10 percent top rate on estates over
$5,000,000").
37 Eisenstein, supra note 23, at 230 (citing H.R. REP. No. 64-922, at 5 (1916)).
38 Id.
39 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (finding the estate tax of 1916
constitutional). Plaintiffs brought suit alleging the estate tax imposed by an Act of Congress on
September 8, 1916, was unconstitutional because it was not uniformly applied. Id. at 346. The Court,
relying on the analysis in Knowlton, found that the tax was imposed on the net estate of every decedent
and did not interfere with the rights of the states to regulate descent and distribution. Id. at 350.
Similarly, the tax had historically been considered not to be a direct tax, but an excise tax, and therefore
equal application was not required. Id. at 349.
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the federal gift tax.40  The passage of the Tax Reform Act of 197641
established a unified transfer tax and credit system that integrated the tax rate
schedules of the separate estate and gift taxes.42 In 1976, Congress
attempted, rather unsuccessfully,43 to address further taxpayer avoidance
with the enactment of the generation-skipping tax.
44
Major changes occurred again when the Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 198145 was passed under the direction of President Reagan.46  Most
significantly, the law included an unlimited marital deduction for both the
estate and gift taxes, which treat a married couple as a single person for
transfer tax purposes.47 In addition, the gift tax annual exclusion was raised
to $10,000 per individual, per year.48 Finally, an increase in the wealth
transfer credit created an exemption for all estates, in the amount of
$600,000. 49 Together, these changes decreased the long-term revenue of the
transfer taxes by two-thirds. 50
B. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
The most recent changes to the estate tax, which this Note addresses,
occurred with the enactment of President Bush's Economic Growth and Tax
40 See Silberstein, supra note 13, at 60 (noting the emergence of the gift tax and the state estate
tax credit) (citing JOHN K. McNuLTY, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 4 (5th ed., 1994)). When
the 1916 estate tax was enacted, many states did not have their own estate or transfer taxes, causing
taxpayers to change their domiciles to avoid paying a "double tax," paying both state and federal estate
taxes. The federal credit for state death transfer taxes allowed taxpayers to subtract any state estate taxes
paid from their federal estate taxes. The gift tax was designed to prevent taxpayer avoidance of the death
taxes by taxing any transfers made during life so that taxpayers would not deliberately decrease their
estates before death. Id.
41 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
42 See Silberstein, supra note 13, at 60 (discussing the unification of the transfer tax and credit
system).
43 Congress had enacted a generation-skipping tax designed to prevent taxpayers from escaping
the estate tax by leaving assets to beneficiaries more than one generation below them. This tax proved to
be cumbersome and complicated, and was repealed retroactively. The generation tax was eventually
successfully revised in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
" See Silberstein, supra note 13, at 61 (noting the first emergence of the generation skipping
tax). Generation skipping occurs when an individual creates a trust that benefits an individual more than
one generation below (or 37.5 years younger) than the donor. Without a generation skipping tax, such a
gift would escape estate taxes which are designed to tax assets passing from one generation to the next.
45 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
4 See Silberstein, supra note 13, at 61 (discussing the changes to the tax that occurred in the
1980s).
47 See id. (explaining that this change allowed for transfer between spouses to occur without
generating any tax liability) (citing JOHN K. McNuLTY, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 9 (5th ed.,
1994)).
48 Id. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
49 Id.
so Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 262 (1983).
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Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA). 51 The Act leads to a one year
"repeal" of the estate tax that is accomplished through periodic increases in
the applicable exclusion amount, as well as reductions in the marginal tax
rate.5  The applicable exclusion amount will increase in stages until 2009,
and the marginal tax rate will decrease until 2007, at which point it will
remain steady at 45 percent.53 In addition, beginning in 2005, instead of the
current state death credit, there is a deduction from the federal estate tax for
any state-imposed estate taxes paid by the taxpayer.54 Eventually, the tax
will be eliminated altogether for the 2010 tax year. However, the Act
includes a "sunset" provision, which repeals all provisions of the EGTRRA
after December 31, 2010.56 As a result, if Congress does not enact any new
laws, the applicable exclusion amount and marginal tax rates will return to
their 2002 levels, $1 million
57 and 55 percent, respectively.
58
Currently, the debate centers over the issue of whether or not
Congress should permanently repeal the estate tax. As this Note shows,
however, the repeal of the estate tax will not only have negative effects on
the distribution of wealth across the nation, but, by allowing for
concentrations of wealth to form and increase, will also disproportionately
burden the nation's black population, which is already disproportionately
poor.59
C. Policy Rationale Behind the Creation and Evolution of the Estate Tax
At its inception, the estate tax was established to generate revenue
for the government's war expenditures. When the need for the additional
5 Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat 38 (2001).
52 EGTRRA, §§ 511(c)(2)(B), 521(a) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2001(c)(1)-(2), 2010(c)).
53 Id. lllustrated in the following table:









*applicable to taxable estates in excess of $2,500,000
5 EGTRRA, § 532(db) (codified at I.R.C. § 2058).
5 EGTRRA, § 901 (codified at I.R.C. § 2664).
56 Id.
57 As adjusted for inflation prior to 2002 Amendment to I.R.C.
58 EGTRRA, § 901(b).
59 See Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80
TEx. L. REV. 987, 1009 (2002) (discussing the disproportion in income and wealth between white and
black households).
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revenue ceased, the tax was repealed. 6° It was only in the 1800s that the idea
of using the tax to allow for a redistribution of the nation's wealth emerged.
Andrew Carnegie led this movement, declaring that at least half of a "rich
man's estate" should be taken in taxes in order to prevent that man's heirs
61from using his inheritance as an excuse not to work or contribute to society.
In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt brought this concept into the
heart of the political forum, proposing a "radical death duty for the purposes
of improving the distribution of the tax burden, producing revenue, and
preserving equality of opportunity., 62 In 1916, a progressive estate tax was
63imposed in response to the harmful social effects of wealth concentration.
Even today, many believe that wealth concentration is "detrimental to the
nation's long term economic growth" and gives affluent members of society
a disproportionately large political voice.64
President Franklin Roosevelt greatly feared the negative effects
generated by concentrations of wealth and, in 1935, he recommended large
and progressive estate taxes to regulate the wealth of a few for the benefit of
the many.65 Today, the estate tax is designed to accomplish three primary
goals: (1) reduce the concentrations wealth in the United States; (2) produce
revenue; and (3) increase the progressiveness of the national tax system.
66
The proposed repeal of the estate tax would significantly and negatively
affect each of these goals.
III. Effects of the Proposed Repeal
A. Reducing Concentrations of Wealth
The concentration of wealth in the nation's elite is far from the ideal
of liberty and equality for all upon which our nation was founded. Wealth
concentration has been an enduring characteristic of the nation's economic
60 Silberstein, supra note 13, at 61.
61 Id.; see also McCoy, supra note 27, at 70 (providing background on the current estate tax).
62 Silberstein, supra note 13, at 61; see also McCoy, supra note 27, at 70 (discussing the
viewpoints of historical supporters of the estate tax).
63 James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 825 (2001).
64 Id. at 827, 843 (noting evidence of the effects of wealth on economic growth and arguing that
wealth provides additional access to political officials and candidates); see also Martin J. McMahon, Jr.,
The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 997 (2004) (noting that there is a "rapidly
growing body of economic literature supporting the thesis that economic inequality impedes, rather than
fosters, economic growth. Thus, not only do the tax cuts not spur economic growth, but because they
increase inequality, they probably impede economic growth.").
65 Eisenstein, supra note 23, at 235.
66 Id. at 231, 235-36.
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landscape since the beginning of the twentieth century.67 The top 1 percent
of the nation's wealth-holders has consistently held 30 percent of total
household sector wealth. Since the early 1920s, the same group has held
almost 40 percent of net worth and, in the late 1980s and 1990s, it held
nearly half of all financial assets.68 The wealthiest of the top 1 percent of
society increased their holdings from 37.4 percent of total wealth in 1989 to
38.5 percent in 1995.69 Furthermore, studies of wealth mobility have shown
that upward movement is rare, and in the 1980s and 1990s, two-thirds of all
financial wealth increases were among those in the top 1 percent. At the
same time, there was little to no movement into the top sectors of the wealth
distribution by those from lower wealth divisions.70  These disparities are
disturbing in large part because wealth provides avenues for success in
society. Wealth represents one of the critical resources "available for
improving life chances, providing future opportunities, securing prestige,
passing status along to one's family, and influencing the political process.'
1
These drastic differences in wealth distribution are not new and have
not gone unnoticed. Both Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt hailed the estate
tax as a political measure that would reduce large concentrations of wealth
that are dangerous to the health and stability of the nation because they
reduce long-run economic performance.72 The correlation between wealth
concentration and poor national economic performance over time has been
well documented.7  Wealth concentration creates educational disadvantages
67 See Lisa A. Keister & Stephanie Moller, Wealth Inequality in the United States, 26 ANN. REV.




70 Id. at 63.
71 See Overton, supra note 59, at 1008 (discussing the importance of wealth in moving through
the ranks of society) (quoting MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 581 (1995)); see also DALTON CONLEY, BEING
BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA, 42-53 (1999) (claiming
that a large number of racial inequalities result from the disparities in generational family wealth).
72 See Charles Davenport & Jay A. Soled, Professors Discuss Details of Enlivening the "Death
Tax," 84 TAx NOTES TODAY, July 26, 1999, at 591, 598, available at LEXIS, 1999 TNT (noting that even
early proponents of the estate tax cited reducing concentrations of wealth as a goal); see also Sarah E.
Waldeck, An Appeal to Charity: Using Philanthropy to Revitalize the Estate Tax, 24 VA. TAX REv. 667,
676-77 (2005) (citing RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH AND SOCIETY, 60 (1982) (quoting
Theodore Roosevelt, Speech at the House of Representatives Office Site (Apr. 14, 1906)) (discussing
Theodore Roosevelt's first suggestion of an inheritance tax in 1906 "so framed as to put it out of the
power of the owner of one of these enormous fortunes to hand more than certain amount to any one
individual").
73 See Repetti, supra note 63, at 831-32 ("A survey of... studies stated: '[S]everal studies have
examined the impact of inequality upon economic growth. The picture they draw is impressively
unambiguous, since they all suggest that greater inequality reduces the rate of growth."' (citing Philippe
Aghion et al., Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories, 37 J.
ECON. LIT. 1615, 1617 (1999))); see also Waldeck, supra note 72, at 677 (noting that recent economic
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for the poor, increases social malaise, and harms the democratic process by
providing the wealthy with too much power.74 John Rawls, a modem
philosopher, supports the estate tax, claiming it will "gradually and
continually.. .correct the distribution of wealth and.. .prevent concentrations
of power detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of
opportunity. '0 5  Because society contributes to the creation of income and
wealth, it is only fair that federal taxation should be able to help decrease
inequalities in wealth.76 While the estate tax has largely failed to break up
the targeted wealth concentration in the nation significantly,77 scholars such
as Charles Davenport and Jay Soled point out that "[tihese [existing] great
concentrations of wealth prove only that the tax has not been as effective as
it might have been. [It is unknown] whether they would have been greater,
or lesser, if the estate tax had not existed. 
7 8
While it may be true that wealth concentration continues to exist,
repeal of the estate tax would affect the degree of concentration. Without
further checks, it is likely that wealth concentration will sharpen, and that
this wealth will be used to create more wealth throughout generations.79
Society is structured to permit the affluent to buy hugely disproportionate
political influence by financing campaigns and supporting causes.8 ° While
studies have been unanimous in finding that high wealth concentration correlates with poor economic
performance).
74 See Repetti, supra note 63, at 827 (explaining the factors that cause wealth concentration to
harm economic performance); see also Debra Lyn Basset, The Politics of the Rural Vote, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
743, 744 (2003) (indicating that concentrated wealth allows certain individuals to possess more political
influence and power than others).
75 Repetti, supra note 63, at 829 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 227 (1971)).
76 See John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1, 84 (2002)
(arguing that inherited economic power is inconsistent with the country's ideals).
77 Davenport & Soled, supra note 72, at 591, 598.
78 Id. at 598-99; see also Waldeck, supra note 72, at 683 (citing John Laitner, Inequality and
Wealth Accumulation: Eliminating the Federal Gift and Estate Tax, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION 258, 279 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001) (showing that "repealing the estate tax would lead
to a 32 percent increase in the share of wealth held by the wealthiest 1 percent of asset-holders")); Lisa A.
Keister, Repealing the Estate Tax; A Recipe for More Inequality?, CONTEXTS MAGAZINE, Winter 2003, at
47 (adding that if Congress had not increased the estate tax cutoff in 1980, "the top 20 percent would have
held 73 percent instead of 83 percent of the national wealth," and "the share of wealth owned by middle-
class and poor families would have increased"). Factors other than the estate tax may have contributed to
increasing wealth inequality in recent decades-assets owned by the wealthy have appreciated rapidly,
while lower class wages have failed to keep up. Id. Therefore, "it is really no surprise that wealth
inequality has grown. But perhaps the estate tax prevented more dramatic increases." Id.
79 See Waldeck, supra note 72, at 683 (citing Laitner, supra note 78, at 279 (showing that
"repealing the estate tax would lead to a 32 percent increase in the share of wealth held by the wealthiest I
percent of asset-holders")).
90 See Richard Schmalbeck, Does the Death Tax Deserve the Death Penalty? An Overview of the
Major Arguments for Repeal of Federal Wealth-Transfer Taxes, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 749, 753 (2000)
("[F]ree speech considerations have made it difficult to constrain the ability of the wealthy to use their
wealth to influence the outcome of political contests."); see also Spencer Overton, The Donor Class:
Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 88 (2004) ("While voters
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there are statutory limitations designed to combat this problem, in reality it is
easy to circumvent the contribution caps. As a result, the large majority of
the individuals who make contributions to political causes and campaigns are
"well-to-do. ''8' In 2002, 0.22 percent of the voting-age population
contributed 76 percent of the funds given to federal candidates by
individuals. 82  Candidates and political officers are more likely to cater to
individuals with greater wealth, and money wins elections.83 Furthermore,
the wealthy have greater access to elected officials than others, and thus
greater access to the legislative process. 84 Wealthy donors are able to give
large contributions to fund American politics and determine which
candidates will be successful.85 Inherited wealth is especially dangerous
because it magnifies the effects of wealth on the political process.86 When
wealth is simply passed from generation to generation, it is less likely that
new perspectives or ideas will be brought to the political agenda.87 A high
concentration of wealth undermines the strength of democracy by denying all
participants an equal voice.88 As a result of disparities in resources, a small,
homogenous, wealthy group donates contributions that comprise almost all
of American political funding, and disparities in the distribution of the
make decisions in the voting booth, money often plays a critical role in the agenda-setting and persuasion
that precede election day.").
81 See Repetti, supra note 63, at 845 (citing statistical data that shows that the vast majority of
political contributions come from families with incomes over $100,000 per year); see also Basset, supra
note 74, at 744 (noting that 81% of political donors have annual incomes of over $100,000).
82 Overton, supra note 80, at 105.
83 See id. at 89 ("[Contributors] often give their contributions with the hope of purchasing special
access and influence during legislative deliberation."); see also Mark C. Alexander, Money in Political
Campaigns and Modem Vote Dilution, 23 LAw & INEQ. 239, 244 (2005) (stating that "the wealthy have
special access and influence; power is concentrated in the hands of the few who control money. After the
campaigns, the wealthy wield inordinate power, enjoying access to elected officials that others do not.").
84 See Repetti, supra note 63, at 847 (explaining how access granted by wealth leads to political
influence). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, (1976), the Supreme Court found that spending money is akin
to political speech because it is so closely connected to effective political communication.
85 See Overton, supra note 80, at 105 (indicating that financial contributions are often the primary
factor in determining the success of political candidates and in setting their agendas once they are
elected); see also Alexander, supra note 83, at 245 ("Accordingly, power, access, and attention flow to
people based on their access to money instead of the people represented, constituency spoken for, or
ideology espoused.").
86 See Repetti, supra note 63, at 850 (noting that inherited wealth allows for the proliferation of
similar political ideas); see also Alexander, supra note 83, at 255 (" As a result of well-placed campaign
contributions, the few have many members of Congress working for them, while the many see their power
diluted.").
87 Repetti, supra note 63, at 850; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (finding that
contributions permit "like-minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political
goals.").
88 See Repetti, supra note 63, at 840 (noting the effect of political contributions on democracy);
see also Alexander, supra note 83, at 244 (noting that Equal Protection requires equality of participation
in the political process).
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89 baknation's wealth lead to disparities in political participation. In 1998, blacks
represented 30 percent of the national population, but only 1 percent of those
who made political contributions to federal campaigns. 9° Even individuals
elected in districts that are primarily inhabited by black residents get the
majority of their contributions from whites. 91 Repealing the estate tax will
only permit concentrations of wealth to strengthen, allowing wealthy persons
to pass even more assets along to their descendents, increasing the property
held by the wealthiest sector of society, and in turn increasing the political
power these individuals may wield.92
The bottom line is that the greater the percentage of the nation's
wealth that is held in the hands of a small number of families, the greater the
degree of wealth inequality.93 "Wealth concentration can create pressure on
democratic institutions, especially within the framework of the American
democracy, where free speech considerations have made it difficult to
constrain the ability of the wealthy to use their wealth to influence the
outcome of political contests. 9 4 Because bequests and gifts represent about
50 percent of all wealth accumulation in the country, a recent study has
found that eliminating the estate tax would increase the richest one percent's
share of the nation's wealth by 20 percent. 95 This would only exacerbate the
inequalities that plague our democracy today, as inherited wealth provides
"subsequent generations with incredible economic and political advantages
not afforded the masses. 9 6 While wealth concentration may exist under the
current estate tax, its repeal would only worsen the harmful division of the
nation's assets, widening the chasm between the poor and the wealthy.
89 See Overton, supra note 80, at 74-75 (suggesting that financial resources instead of political
interest determine the class of political contributors); see also Basset, supra note 74, at 744 (noting that
95% of political donors are white, 80% are men, and 80% are over the age of 45).
90 See Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities and the Political Function of Property, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 1553, 1554 (2002) (citing a study done by The Joyce Foundation indicating that in a survey of
individuals who contributed more than $200 to political campaigns, less than 1% were black, while 95%
were white).
91 See Overton, supra note 90, at 1569 (noting the lack of political contributions from blacks)
(citing ROBERT SiGNH, THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS: RACIAL POLITICS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS
125-26(1998)).
92 See Keister, supra note 78 at 45 ("When wealth ownership becomes more concentrated, the
benefits of wealth are enjoyed by fewer and fewer people. The wealthy gain more control of major
institutions, while those with little or no wealth lose control .... ).
93 See Schmalbeck, supra note 80, at 752-53 (pointing out the correlation between concentration
of wealth and inequality).
94 ld. at 753.
95 Repetti, supra note 63, at 856 (citing John Laitner, Simulating the Effects on Inequality and
Wealth Accumulation of Eliminating the Federal Gift and Estate Tax 2 (Apr. 17, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the New York University Law Review)).
96 Steinkamp, supra note 76, at 74.
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B. Raising Revenue
Historically, the estate tax met its original primary goal of generating
revenue. In 1934, transfer tax revenues were 27 percent of individual
income tax revenues, and in 1936 more than 56 percent of income taxes were
derived from transfer taxes. 97 While currently transfer taxes compose a mere
1.2 percent of total tax receipts,98 yielding $24.1 billion in 2004,99 they are
significant enough that their elimination or reduction would force some fiscal
offset: other taxes would have to be raised; other taxes could not be cut;
borrowing would be greater; or spending would have to be slashedi °° In
addition, these revenue values have a strong potential to increase with time
due to stock market potential and increases in inter-generational transfers as
the baby boom generation gets older. 01 Regardless of one's political or
ideological position on government spending, the loss of the revenue
generated by the current estate tax will cause fiscal constraints.10 2
EGTRRA will cost an estimated $138 billion between 2001 and
2011103 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that permanent repeal
of the estate tax as of 2010 would reduce revenues by at least $270 billion
through fiscal year 2015,10 4 and Congressional Budget Office projections
estimate that by 2014 annual revenue losses of more than $60 billion will
result if repeal is permanent.'0 5 The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
has determined that repealing the estate tax would "add trillions of dollars to
future deficits."'106 The Center estimates that repealing the estate tax would
cost $1 trillion dollars over the period between 2012 and 2021, including
97 Krisanne Schlachter, Note, Repeal of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Will it Happen and
How Will It Affect Our Progressive Tax System?, 19 VA. TAX REv. 781,789 (2000).
98 GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 1.
99 Id.
too See Davenport & Soled, supra note 72, at 591, 593 ([E]limination or reduction [of the estate
taxes] would force some fiscal offset..."); see also GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 1 (noting
that one tax cannot be cut without causing a change in the overall system).
101 GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 1.
102 See Davenport & Soled, supra note 72, at 591, 593 ("The loss of transfer taxes would further
constrain fiscal action whether one is desirous of less government spending, the same, or more
government spending."); see also Waldeck, supra note 72, at 692-93 ("[The vast majority of Americans
should favor the tax; in its absence, individual tax burdens will increase, or government [benefits] will be
curtailed.").
103 GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 201
104 Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale & Jeffrey Rohaly, Options to Reform the Estate Tax,
TAX POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS (Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, D.C.), March 2005, at 5; see also
GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 1 (noting a cost of $290 billion over the 2006-2015 budget
window: $9.1 billion over 2006 to 2010, and $280.9 billion over 2011 to 2015).
105 Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Estate Tax Repeal and the Budget Process, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Sept. 6, 2004, at 1049, 1051, available at LEXIS, 2004 TNT (citing CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGETARY PROPOSALS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005 11
(Mar. 2004)).
106 MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 8.
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$745 billion in lost revenue and $225 billion in increased interest payments
on the national debt.
10 7
Repealing the estate tax would likely result in greater government
borrowing to make up for the decrease in government revenues, increasing
the government deficit, 08 and decreasing capital that would otherwise be
available for investment in the economy.i' 9 All of this would come at the
same time the government is already making huge cuts in government
spending. 10 Federal discretionary spending is currently being cut, while
domestic programs are fighting for limited resources with increasing military
spending and homeland security costs.1 ' Without the federal and state
revenue generated by the estate tax, the effects of cuts in programs designed
to help low-income and vulnerable families will be worsened."l 2  For
example, the budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2007 provides no new money
for Title I funding for poverty aid to school districts, does not increase
federal Pell Grants," 3 and eliminates 42 programs, including parent-resource
centers and vocational programs targeted at the poor.'14 The Department of
Housing and Urban Development received similar cuts, slashing funds for
the Community Development Block Grants Fund by 20 percent, a program
whose budget is used for affordable housing in needy areas, among other
things.115 These budget cuts weigh heavily on programs designed to help the
poor, a group that is disproportionately black, and therefore are likely to
unfairly burden this minority population.
Further, the current values of revenue derived from the estate tax
must be put in context. The estate tax generates 1.4 percent of total tax
receipts, a seemingly paltry number. While it appears that the estate tax's
contribution to government revenues could easily be eliminated, the revenue
loss will have an effect. The tax expenditure budget for 2001 shows estate
tax revenues in 2001 were approximately $30 billion. As a consequence of
107 Id. The reason for the discrepancies between this figure and the one proposed by the Joint
Committee is that those estimates cover only four years of the repeal.
108 See id. (noting repercussion of repeal on the nation's economy).
109 Id.
110 See GARY D. BASS & JOHN S. IRONS, OMB WATCH, THE ESTATE TAX AND CHARITABLE
GIvING 3 (2003) (discussing current government overspending).
I Id.; see also FY 2007 Budget Proposal: Agency-by-Agency Breakdown, Domestic Programs
Take Hit, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at A19 [hereinafter FY 2007 Budget Proposal] ("The $2.77 trillion
budget plan President Bush sent to Congress yesterday emphasizes spending on the country's fight against
terrorism, while deeply cutting domestic programs to deal with a budget deficit projected to reach an all-
time high this year.").
112 Id.
113 A need-based financial aid program for college students.
114 See Lois Romano, FY 2007 Budget Proposal, supra note 111 (discussing the specific budget
provisions for education).
115 See Zachary A. Goldfarb, FY 2007 Budget Proposal, supra note 111 (summarizing the budget
for the Department of Housing and Urban Development).
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homeowners' ability to deduct their state and local property taxes, the
government lost $23.1 billion in fiscal year 2001.116 Similarly, because it
imposes only a partial tax on social security benefits, the government lost
$25.8 billion in revenues the same year. 1 7 If the estate tax were permanently
repealed, the lost revenues could easily be replaced by eliminating the
homeowner's deduction or taxing social security benefits, but the public is
unlikely to support such measures.' 18  Taxpayers view the homeowner's
deduction and social security benefits as essential parts of the tax structure.
It is unlikely they would be willing to sacrifice them for the benefit of
millionaires.
C. Progressivity: Who Pays the Estate Tax?
Not only do transfer taxes raise revenue, but they raise revenue from
those who have the ability to pay. 1 9 A progressive tax system places larger
societal costs on those who receive the most and benefit the most from our
society. 12  The estate tax is very progressive, 121 as taxpayers in the highest
10 percent income bracket pay almost all of it. 122  Despite the fact that
taxpayers with substantial resources are able to hire professionals to help
them avoid taxes and exploit any loopholes in the system, almost 99 percent
of the tax is paid by the top 5 percent, and over one-third is paid by the
richest 1 in 1,000.123 In 2004, only 1.3 percent of 2.4 million decedents paid
any estate tax.24 Further, estates over $5 million made up 11.5 percent of
taxable estates, but contributed 51 percent of the estate tax revenues in
2004.125 The reason for this is the high applicable exclusion amount. In
2006, the applicable exclusion amount is $2 million; therefore, only estates
composed of more than $2 million dollars worth of assets will be subject to
the tax. Those with estates over $2 million represent only a small proportion
116 Schmalbeck, supra note 80, at 762-63.
117 Id. If the government were to fully tax taxpayer Social Security benefits, it could recoup an
additional $25.8 billion in revenues.
ns See Mark Schwanhausser, Dreaded Tax Hitting More Americans, BRADENTON HERALD, Feb.
19, 2006, at 1 (noting that one of Bush's tax advisory panel suggested cutting mortgage interest
deductions in order to make up for tax cuts, and that the suggestion was met with immediate outrage from
homeowners).
119 See Davenport & Soled, supra note 72, at 591, 597 (noting the progressivity of the estate tax);
see also Waldeck, supra note 72, at 684 (noting the estate tax has the ability to contribute to the
progressivity of the nation's tax system).
120 See Davenport & Soled, supra note 72, at 598 (explaining what progressivity means).
121 The term "progressive" means that the rate of the tax increases as the total amount taxable
increases.
2 Burman et al., supra note 104, at 2.
'2 Id.
12 GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 9.
125 Id. at 10.
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of society, showing that most of the large majority that has been encouraged
to despise the estate tax has little reason to fear actually paying it. 126 In fact,
the average size of inheritances is expected to reach only $99,000 in 2015,
well below the $1 million exemption that would be in place if repeal were
not made permanent and the sunset provision of EGTRRA came into
effect. 127
The estate tax is by far the most progressive of any of the federal
taxes. 128 Of the approximately 2.3 million deaths per year, only 1.9 percent
of estates pay any estate tax, and only 4.3 percent file a return at all.' 29 As
stated, approximately 99 percent of estates pay $0 in estate taxes.
30
Additionally, for the few estates that do pay the estate tax, the effective tax
rate (the percentage of the estate paid in taxes) is far less that the top estate
tax rate.13' For example, in 2004, the effective tax rate averaged only about
19 percent, while the top estate tax rate imposed was 50 percent. 32  The
effective tax rate is so much lower than the marginal rate, as previously
stated, because taxes are only imposed on the amount of the estate that
exceeds the exemption level. 133 The increasingly large exemption amount
results in a decreasing effective tax rate. Therefore, unable to escape the
taxes despite their many tax advisors, only the richest of the rich, the top 1
percent, pay estate taxes that represent a figure anywhere near a significant
portion of their estates. 134  By the time the exemption level reaches the
maximum amount in 2009, $3.5 million, only 3 in 1000 decedents will have
an estate large enough to be taxed-hence the nickname for bills proposing
estate tax repeal: the "Paris Hilton tax cut.' 35 However, the problem is that
"polls routinely show that some 20 percent of the American population
126 Davenport & Soled, supra note 72, at 591, 595-96 (citing DAN MILLER, THE ECONOMICS OF
THE ESTATE TAX 9 (Joint Economic Committee 1998)).
127 GRAETz & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 95.
128 See Brian Roach, Progressive and Regressive Taxation in the United States: Who's Really
Paying (and Not Paying) their Fair Share? 7, 16 (Global Dev. and Env't Inst., Tufts University, Working
Paper No. 03-10, 2003), available at http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/wp/03-10-Tax-ncidence.pdf
(evaluating the degree of progressivity of each of the nation's federal taxes); see also Jane G. Gravelle &
Steven Maguire, Estate and Gift Taxes: Economic Issues, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 24, 2000, at 551, 555,
available at LEXIS, 2000 TNT (discussing the vertical equity of the tax); see also Graetz, supra note 50,
at 272 (claiming that the estate tax is responsible for one-third of the progressivity of the federal tax
system).
129 Gravelle & Maguire, supra note 128, at 551, 555 (using statistics from 1999).
130 MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 8, at 1.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 2.
134 MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 8, at 1.
135 Id.; see also INDEPENDENT SECTOR, ESTATE TAX FACT SHEET 2 (2005), http:l
edinonline.org/programs/gr/EstateTaxFactSheet.pdf [hereinafter INDEPENDENT SECTOR] ("[Iff the estate
tax is retained at its 2009 levels, only 0.3 percent of all persons who die that year would be subject to the
tax.").
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believe that they are in the top 1 percent, and another 20 percent believe that
they will soon reach that echelon."
136
If the estate tax were to be removed, all of the progressivity in the
country's tax system would be derived solely from the nation's income
tax. 137 Because realized rates of return fall as wealth increases, 138 the income
tax does not properly tax the wealth that creates the taxed income, and the
income tax alone will not be able to maintain the progressivity of the nation's
federal tax system. 139 Consequently, the estate tax is not only a significant
part of the progressivity of the nation's tax system, but also necessary if the
nation intends to keep the tax system progressive and reflective of the
nation's value of equal opportunity for all.
D. On States
As previously indicated, § 2011 of the Internal Revenue Code
allowed a federal estate tax credit for any estate tax paid to a state
government. 14° The credit had been a fixture in the federal estate tax since
1926.141 At that time the federal government was considering either reducing
estate tax rates or repealing the tax altogether because the government no
longer needed the revenues to fund World War 1.142 At the same time, the
states were looking for ways to diminish the competition that had begun to
arise between the states to attract wealthy residents. 143 In addition, the states
had always made better use of the revenues from the tax than the federal
136 GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 96.
137 See Graetz, supra note 50, at 272-73 (discussing the need for the estate tax in order to
maintain a progressive tax system); see also Roach, supra note 128, at 7, 16 (noting that aside from the
estate tax, the nation's only other progressive taxes are corporate and personal income taxes).
138 See C. EUGENE STEUERLE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OTA PAPER 50: THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REALIZED INCOME AND WEALTH, (1982) (looking at reported or realized
income relative to the value of assets). Realized income is generally in the form of a direct cash flow
from the underlying assets, while unrealized income is in the form of appreciation of the value of assets.
Because the federal income tax is a tax on realized income, the wealthy, who generally hold a larger
percentage of their assets, rather than earn them on a-yearly basis, pay a lower percentage of income taxes
than those who might be less wealthy overall. Since a progressive tax should impose more tax on those
who have more assets, the income tax lacks a certain degree of progressivity needed to maintain the
overall progressivity of the federal tax system. Id.
139 See Graetz, supra note 50, at 273 (explaining why the income tax alone cannot create a
progressive tax system); see also Roach, supra note 128, at 7, 16 (demonstrating that without the
extremely progressive estate tax, the nation's overall tax progressivity, which is currently only very
slightly progressive, will swing up and become regressive).
140 I.R.C. § 2011 (2005)
'' See Oskar R. Harmon, The Estate Tax: Repeal or Reform?, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 18,
2001, at 2072, available at LEXIS, 2001 TNT (discussing the "compromise" legislation that led to today's
estate tax) (citing Repeal of Federal Estate Tax Would Have Effect on States, FTA BULLETIN (Federation
of Tax Administrators, D.C.), Feb. 22, 2001).
142 Id. (citing FrA BULLETIN, supra note 141).
143 Id.
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government. 144 Therefore, the state death tax credit was established in 1926
to serve two goals: (1) to divert tax revenues from the federal government to
the states, and (2) to halt the competition between the states by establishing a
minimum combined federal and state estate tax rate.
45
If a state imposed its own estate tax, the state death tax credit
reduced the amount of the federal estate tax dollar for dollar with the state's
tax, up to a certain limit. 46 The state death tax credit was designed to be the
largest amount possible without increasing the estate's total tax burden.
47
Essentially, "[t]he state tax act[ed] as a 'pick-up' or 'sponge' tax, [by] merely
imposing tax[es] up to the amount of the allowable federal credit, thereby
shifting revenue from the federal government to the states."' 48 The credit
operated to make state death tax law more uniform, to reduce the state's
administrative responsibility to collect and enforce state death taxes, and to
minimize the costs of taxpayer compliance. 49  However, EGTRRA
provisions phased out the state credit, reducing the amount of credit by 25
percent in 2002, 50 percent in 2003, and 75 percent in 2004.150 As of 2005, a
taxpayer is no longer given any state death tax credit. Instead, taxpayers are
given a limited deduction for any state estate taxes paid. Some states have
chosen not to--or been constitutionally prevented from151-- enacting their
own state death taxes. 52 Other states have passed laws to "decouple" the
state estate tax from the federal system or to tie the state death tax system to
pre-EGTRRA law.'
5 3
Several problems have resulted from the change and will worsen if
repeal is made permanent. First, various legislative and administrative
I" Id.
145 Id. at 2073 (citing FTA BULLETIN, supra note 141).
14 I.R.C. § 2011 (2005).
147 See KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION 2-22 (Abridged
Student ed., Warren, Gorham & Lamont of RIA 2003) (1998) (discussing estate tax credits as they apply
to estate planning).
148 Schlachter, supra note 97, at 799; see also TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER
TAXES, Am. BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON REFORM OF FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXES 7 (2004)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE] (explaining how the state death tax credit shifted revenue from state to the
federal government in states using a pick-up tax).
149 See TASK FORCE, supra note 149, at 8 (discussing the objectives of the original state death tax
credit).
10 EGTRRA, § 531(a)(l)-(3). The state death tax credit is replaced with a deduction under I.R.C.
§ 2058 (2005).
151 NEV. CONST. art. X, § 1(7); FLA. CONST. art VII, § 5(a). See, e.g., Steven D. Nofziger,
Comment, EGTRRA and the Past, Present, and Future of Oregon's Inheritance Tax System, 84 OR. L.
REV. 317, 325 (2005); Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell M. Gans, Wealth Transfer Tax Repeal: Some
Thoughts on Policy and Planning, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 15, 2001, at 393, available at LEXIS, 2001
TNT (citing the state constitutional provisions of Florida and Nevada that prohibit establishment of a state
estate tax).
152 See TASK FORCE, supra note 149, at 8 (looking at the effect of the elimination of the state
death tax credit in 2005).
153 Id.
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requirements need to be put in place in each state to design and implement a
new state estate tax. 54  States will be required to spend valuable legislative
time and resources to implement new systems of inheritance taxation. For
some states, implementing an estate tax is politically difficult, or even
impossible-for example, the state constitutions of both Florida and Nevada
prohibit the imposition of an estate tax. 55  Any amendment to the state's
constitution to impose an estate tax would probably be unpopular and
therefore unlikely. Second, the individual estate tax imposed in each state
will create a level of competition between the states to have the lowest (or
no) estate taxes, encouraging "state-shopping" by taxpayers. 156  Taxpayers,
especially elderly taxpayers, would have an incentive to change their
domicile in order to receive the most favorable tax treatment. Those
individuals who are unable to move will be penalized for their domicile if the
state in which they resided at the time of the repeal implements a hefty estate
tax to make up for lost revenues. States are already beginning to have to cut
their estate taxes in order to attract residents, creating a "race to the bottom"
that will leave states with increasingly less or no revenue from estate
taxes. 157  Over the ten-year lifespan of EGTRRA, it has been estimated that
the states will lose more than $50 billion in state estate tax revenue.
58
Without this revenue, states will be forced to cut spending or raise taxes in
other areas. Similar to the effect on the reduction of revenue to the federal
15 See Jeffrey A. Cooper, John R. Ivimey & Donna D. Vincenti, State Estate Taxes After
EGTRRA: A Long Day's Journey Into Night, 17 QuINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 317, 324 (2004) (discussing the
effect of EGTRRA on states' revenues, and the actions the states have taken in response); see also Harley
Duncan, Federation of Tax Administrators, State Responses to Estate Tax Changes Enacted as Part of the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, (Oct. 24, 2002),
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/Estatetax.html (laying out the effects of the EGTRRA on states and their
responses to these changes).
155 NEv. CONST. art. X, § 1(7); FLA. CONST. art VI, § 5(a). See, e.g., Nofziger, supra note 151, at
325; Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 151, at 393 (citing the state constitutional provisions of Florida and
Nevada that prohibit establishment of a state estate tax).
156 See Schlachter, supra note 97, at 800 (noting that state estate tax rates are likely to spark
competition between states to bring in elderly residents); see also TASK FORCE, supra note 148, at 8
(pointing out that states will have little incentive to conform their estate tax rates to federal estate tax
rates).
157 See Cooper et al., supra note 154, at 332 (explaining that states with no estate tax will likely
experience an influx of new residents). A "race to the bottom" means that residents in a state will be
inclined to move to a state that has a lower estate tax rate if they have considerable assets to protect. Their
current state will recognize this incentive, and lower its estate tax rate in order to compete with other
states' rates. Eventually, this competition will bring states to eliminate their estate tax, and the
corresponding revenues, in order to keep their residents. Id.; see also Dean L. Surkin, The Impact of
Decoupling of State Estate Taxes on a Taxpayer's Choice of Domicile, 101 J. TAx'N 49, 49 (2004)
(discussing the estate tax options for the residents of different states).
158 Cooper et al., supra note 154, at 323; ELIZABETH C. McNICHOL, IRIS J LAV & JOSEPH
LLOBRERA, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, STATES CAN RETAIN THEIR ESTATE TAXES EVEN
AS THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX iS PHASED OuT 1 (2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/l-31-02sfp.pdf.
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government, this most likely will hurt taxpayers less able to pay taxes than
wealthy estate holders, a group that is disproportionately black.
E. On Charities
The current estate tax law permits decedents to donate an unlimited
amount of their estate to qualified charities and to deduct 100 percent of
those donations from their gross estate. Essentially, taxpayers are often
faced with a decision to leave money to the federal government in the form
of taxes or to charity in the form of bequests. 59 The charitable deduction is
the second largest type of deduction taken from the estate tax behind the
unlimited marital deduction. 6° The deduction was based on the theory that
the loss of revenue from taxes to the government would be balanced out by
the decrease in the government's financial obligations for appropriations
from public funds, as well as by the benefits to the nation's general
welfare.' 6  This deduction is most heavily utilized by the largest estates. 62
Estate tax returns in 2003 showed that estates valued at more than $10
million were responsible for over half of charitable bequests, and estates
valued at over $5 million contributed more than two-thirds of all charitable
bequests. 163 In 2004, estates filing returns donated 7.8 percent of their total
assets to charities, with estates of $20 million or greater donating 17.6
percent of their assets. 164 Because intergenerational transfers of wealth are
likely to increase over time, charitable bequests should also increase, 65 but
this will not be the case if the estate tax is permanently repealed.
Section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code permits unlimited
charitable bequests to be deducted from a decedent's taxable estate, causing
the cost of charitable giving to decrease as estate tax rates increase.
159 See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 170 (discussing William Gates' explanation of the
risks repeal create for charities).
160 Coalition for America's Priorities, Get the Facts: The Estate Tax and Charitable Giving,
http://www.psapoll.com/img/estate/etfs-6.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
161 See Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review and a
Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1073 (2003) (explaining how charitable organizations are
subsidized through tax incentives rather than direct government expenditures).
162 See Burman et al., supra note 104, at 5 ("[Tlhose with very large estates make the most
bequests."); see also Waldeck, supra note 72, at 699 (noting that at every income level, the wealthier
individuals make the larger annual contributions to charities).
163 Burman et al., supra note 104, at 5. The same trend was true in FY2000. In that year, more
than 70% of charitable bequests were from estates greater than $3.5 million, more than 60% from estates
larger than $7 million, and more than 40% from estates larger than $20 million. ROBERT MCCLELLAND &
PAMELA GREENE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ESTATE TAX AND CHARrrABLE GIVING 2-3
(2004).
16 GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 16.
16 See BASS & IRONS, supra note 110, at 4 (demonstrating that evidence shows that between 1995
and 2001 charitable bequests almost doubled, from $8.7 billion in 1995 to $16.2 billion in 2001).
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Essentially, repeal would put a heavy price tag on giving and would increase
the amount of the after-tax wealth of the decedents.166 A full repeal, which
effectively reduces the estate tax rate to zero, increases the cost of giving to
100 percent of the amounts given. 67  Studies have shown that the cost of
giving affects taxpayers, and that the tax rate is the single most significant
incentive for charitable giving. 68  In 2003, returns filed demonstrated an
18.2 percent decrease in charitable giving from 2002, dropping from $17.83
billion in 2002 to $14.6 billion in 2003.169 Among other contributing factors,
this decline is the result of more wealthy individuals becoming exempt from
the estate tax, which decreases their incentive to give. 170 If the cost of giving
rises to 100 percent, charities will suffer immensely.
Research has consistently illustrated that the more estate taxes are
levied, the larger charitable bequests become.'17  Charitable bequests are an
important source of funding for programs designed to supplement programs
for the poor in the areas of education, health, and housing. In 1921, when the
charitable deduction was first established, charitable bequests jumped from
0.121 percent of gross estates to 3.043 percent. 172  Over time, charitable
giving has increased as the marginal estate tax rate has increased.
73
Treasury economist David Joulfaian found that 1997 charitable bequests
would have declined by at least 12 percent if the estate tax had been
166 See Jon M. Bakija & William G.M. Gale, Effects of Estate Tax Reform on Charitable Giving,
TAX NOTES TODAY, June 23, 2003, at 1841, 1842, available at LEXIS, 2003 TNT (providing data on the
correlation between estate tax rates and the amount of charitable giving). For example, a charitable
bequest of $1 from an estate taxed at a 45% rate creates a 45 cent reduction in the estate's tax bill and cuts
bequests to other beneficiaries by 55 cents. Therefore, the cost of giving the dollar to the charity was 55
cents, the amount the estate was reduced. As the tax rate decreases, the cost of giving to charity increases.
A decrease in the tax rate from 45% to 30% increases the cost of giving $1 from 55 cents to 70 cents.
MCCLELLAND & GREENE, supra note 163, at 3.
167 MCCLELLAND & GREENE, supra note 163, at 3.
168 Id.; see also Waldeck, supra note 72, at 671 (noting that charitable giving is sensitive to
changes in the tax code because donors care about the price of making charitable gifts).
169 INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 135.
170 See Jim Grote, Coping with Wrenches in the Charitable Giving Toolbox, JOURNAL OF
FINANCIAL PLANNING, Aug. 2003, available at http://www.fpanet.org/joumal/articles/2003-
Issues/jfp0803-art-two.cfm (discussing the primary factors of the 2003 decline in charitable giving:
economic downturn, changes in the tax code and estate tax, and negative reactions to the handling of Sept.
11 donations).
171 IRIS J. LAV & JAMES SLY, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, ESTATE TAX REPEAL: A
COSTLY WINDFALL FOR THE WEALTHIEST AMERICANS,(2001), http://www.cbpp.org/5-25-00tax.pdf
(citing David Joulfaian, Estate Taxes and Charitable Bequests by the Wealthy (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 7663, 2000)); see also Waldeck, supra note 72, at 670 (finding that studies
show "when the marginal estate tax rate is higher, so is the ratio of charitable bequests to the gross value
of estates").
172 Frank J. Doti, Estate Tax Repeal: Historical Data Indicate Philanthropy May Suffer, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Apr. 14, 2003, at 283-84, available at LEXIS, 2003 TNT.
173 See BASS & IRONS, supra note 110, at 10 (showing the trend of charitable bequest giving as a
percentage of estates).
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repealed. 174  Congressional Budget Office economists Robert McClelland
and Pamela Greene found that repeal would likely decrease giving by 6 to 12
percent, which in 2000 would have slashed charitable giving by $13 billion
to $25 billion.1 75 This amount is greater than the $11 billion in corporate
charitable contributions from that year. 76 Further evidence in support of the
estate tax as an incentive for giving is suggested by the fact that widows,
widowers, and single decedents-those who cannot use the marital deduction
to avoid the estate tax-tend to give a larger percentage of their estates to
charity. 1
77
Even larger numbers have been suggested by scholars Jon M. Bakija
and William G. Gale, who found that a repeal of the estate tax would reduce
charitable bequests by an amount between 22 and 37 percent ($3.6 to $6
billion) per year. 78  Their research was reported to be the "most
comprehensive" study by the OMB Watch. 179 Bakija and Gale argue that
"[t]he qualitative conclusion that repeal would significantly reduce giving
holds even if repeal raises aggregate pretax wealth and income by plausible
amounts."'180  In their article, they show three different types of evidence
supporting their claim that repeal would significantly reduce charitable
giving.' 8 ' Time-series and cross-sectional evidence, along with evidence
collected over time and from varying locations, indicated that the increase in
the price of giving caused by the repeal would largely decrease the amount of
giving. 182 Further, heirs are unlikely to be as charitable as those who have
earned their money.183 A study recently found that for every $1000 of earned
wealth, entrepreneurs each give $4.56 to charity, but for every $1000 of
inherited wealth, heirs give only $0.76.184
174 Lay & Sly, supra note 171; see also GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 16-17 (finding
similar numbers to those David Joulfaian published).
15 Burman et al., supra note 104, at 6; see also DAVID KAMIN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES, NEW CBO STUDY FINDS THAT ESTATE TAx REPEAL WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE
CHARITABLE GIvING (2004), http://www.cbpp.org/8-3-04tax.pdf (showing similar numbers).
176 Kamin, supra note 175.
177 See BASS & IRONS, supra note 110, at 11 (showing that individuals facing the estate tax tend to
give more to charity); see also IRS Statistics of Income Bulletin, Estate Tax Returns Filed for 2001
Decedents Making Charitable Bequests, Publication 1136, revised Sept. 2005, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/01es04ms.xls (showing that in 2001 single decedents left $2.9 billion to charities and widowers and
widows left $7.9 billion to charities, while married decedents left only $1.4 billion to charities).
178 Bakija et al., supra note 166, at 1841-42.
179 BASS & IRONS, supra note 110, at 1.
ISO Bakija et al., supra note 166, at 1841-42.
181 Id. at 1843.
182 Id.
183 See Coalition for America's Priorities, supra note 160 (looking at the effect of the estate tax on
charitable giving).
184 d; see also BASS & IRONS, supra note 110, at 3 (finding that research shows "wealthy
entrepreneurs gave six times as much to charities as people who inherited their wealth").
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The revenue the government raises from the estate tax, among other
things, is used to fund necessary and important programs, primarily for the
benefit of the poor, ranging from health care and education to housing. 185 if
the estate tax were repealed, these revenues would have to be collected from
other sources, most likely from other taxpayers, who would empirically be
less wealthy than those paying the estate tax. 86 Alternatively, a repeal could
cause cuts in the benefits and services funded by the estate tax revenue,
which would affect even those too poor to have to pay taxes at all.
187
Furthermore, the reduction in charitable donations would force charities to
rely on direct expenditures by the government, creating an additional
governmental cost to add to the already monstrous national debt, while at the
same time increasing the government's authority and unwelcome influence
in the charitable arena.
188
The most damaging feature of the potential repeal of the estate tax is
its vicious double punch. Not only will there be less incentive to provide
charitable bequests, but lifetime giving will also suffer. Because there will
be no estate tax, taxpayers will have a reduced incentive to decrease their
estate by engaging in tax-free charitable gift giving during life, and
charitable donations will no longer provide a way to escape heavy taxes at
death. 189  The decision to make a taxable gift when there is no estate tax
makes sense only if the non-tax benefits to the donee outweigh the donor's
gift tax costs. 19° Even with the annual gift tax exclusion,191 it is likely that
the amount a transferor can transfer free of tax during life will be
185 See Bass et al., supra note 10 (noting that the estate tax "[g]enerates revenue at the state and
federal level to sustain many of the programs that serve low-income and disadvantaged people."); see also
OMB WATCH, ESTATE TAX AND GOVERNMENT REVENUE (2001), http://www.ombwatch.org/article/
articleview/4001193 (stating that "in very direct ways, the estate tax repeal can result in significant cuts in
human needs programs").
186 Bass et al., supra note 10; William H. Gates et al., Bill Gates, Sr., George Soros, Steven
Rockefeller, 100 Others Oppose Estate Tax Repeal, U.S. NEWSWiRE, Feb. 14, 2001, at P1 ("The billions
of dollars in state and federal revenue lost will inevitably be made up either by increasing taxes on those
less able to pay or by cutting Social Security, Medicare, environmental protection, and many other
government programs so important to our nation's continued well-being.").
187 Gates et al., supra note 186.
188 See Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 151, at 395 (discussing the negative effects of repeal on
charitable contributions); see also MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 8 (discussing the effect repeal
would have on the already mounting national deficit).
189 See TASK FORCE, supra note 148, at 6 (noting that taxpayers are likely to be less charitably
inclined when the tax benefit from charitable contributions is removed); see also Waldeck, supra note 72,
at 670-71 (finding that because charitable bequests can be deducted from the estate tax, "charitable giving
will decrease in the wake of repeal, perhaps precipitously").
19o See TASK FORCE, supra note 148, at 6 (noting that taxpayers are likely to be less charitable
when the tax benefit from charitable contributions is removed).
191 I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2005). Beginning in 2006, the annual gift tax exclusion, the amount that
may pass tax free to any donor each year, is $12,000 per year, per donee.
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significantly less than the amount a donee can transfer tax-free at death.
92
The Bama Research Group for Epsilon determined that the percentage of
adults engaged in charitable giving fell from 80 percent in 2001 to 69 percent
a year later in 2002 after the estate tax exemption amount and marginal rates
increased.193 This represented the least amount of giving recorded in the last
forty years.' 94 While there are several reasons this may have occurred,
including fluctuations in the stock market and the economy, one reasonable
explanation for this phenomenon is that the uncertainty over whether the
estate tax would be repealed caused individuals either to gamble that it
would be eliminated or to wait until they knew for sure, both of which led to
decreased charitable gifts. 95 Studies have determined that lifetime charitable
giving will drop by at least 12 percent if the estate tax is repealed.
96
Estimates indicate that this drop would create an additional loss of more than
$5 billion to charities in addition to the $3.6 to $6 billion lost from bequests,
resulting in a devastating total loss of revenue to charities of about $10
billion a year.'
97
The repeal would remove an incentive to create private
foundations 19 and low- or no-estate tax trusts for the benefit of charities both
during life and at death. 99 Private foundations200 are generally founded by
individuals, families, or groups of individuals and typically are organized as
nonprofit corporations or charitable trusts. 20 1  Private foundations provide
billions of dollars each year in grants to charitable organizations,
communities and individuals. 20 2  The non-profit programs' private
foundation grants are used to fund activities that range from education to
health and human services to arts and humanities.20 3
192 Id.; see also TASK FORCE, supra note 148, at 6 (explaining the effects of the decoupling of the
estate and gift taxes).
193 Doti, supra note 172, at 282, 284, 287 (citing THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, December 8,
2002, at 1).
194 Id. (citing THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, December 8, 2002, at 1).
195 Id.
196 BASS & IRONS, supra note 110, at 11.
197 Id.
198 See David Cay Johnston, Some Experts Questioning Bush Plan on Estate Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
January 29, 2001, at A21 (explaining that private foundations are created because gifts made to the
charitable private foundations are used to decrease the estate tax).
199 Id.
moo A private foundation is a domestic or foreign organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) which
exempts organizations devoted to religious, charitable or educational purposes, other than excluded
categories listed in I.R.C. § 509. Private foundations are given estate tax-exempt status under I.R.C. §
2055(a).
201 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, COMPENDIUM OF STUDIES OF TAX-ExEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS, 1989-1998: PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS (2002) available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/98eopfin.pdf (discussing and defining private foundations).
202 See id. (enumerating beneficiaries of charitable contributions).
203 See id. (describing the typical recipients of private foundation grants).
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Private foundations are popular with the wealthy because they allow
the donors and their heirs to maintain control over the assets and direct the
disposition of funds in the foundations for charitable purposes. 204  For
example, a charitable remainder trust allows the donor to leave assets to an
heir with the provision that upon the heir's death, the remaining assets are
left to charity. Or, the reverse, a charitable lead trust allows the donor to
give a charity a right to assets during a fixed period, with the remainder
going to a donee named by the original donor at the end of that period.
Private foundations, on the other hand, provide control to the donor by
establishing an organization to distribute funds to various charities for
charitable purposes at the direction of the donor and his heirs. Generally,
foundation gifts create continued annual giving to other organizations that
205increase over time. In 1998, private foundations received 42 percent of all
charitable bequests, totaling $6.4 billion, the largest amount of all charitable
bequest recipient categories.2° Charitable bequests to private foundations
were, on average, $3.6 million each.2 °7 Repeal of the estate tax will decrease
the creation of foundations and gifts to existing foundations, and in turn will
decrease the grants charities receive from such foundations.2 8 Such grants
are often used to fund educational and medical programs, among various
other programs, all designed to benefit the poor. Without the revenues from
charitable bequests, many of these programs will be eliminated or greatly cut
back.
The Independent Sector, a national non-profit organization
composed of more than 500 member charities, foundations, and corporate
philanthropy programs, opposes full and permanent repeal of the estate tax
because of the losses to charities that will result. They state:
Full repeal of the estate tax would have a devastating impact
on tens of thousands of charitable organizations, serving
millions of individuals, families and communities everyday
while benefiting only a very small number of estates. Even
estate tax reform legislation that drastically cuts the rate of the
estate tax or that effectively eliminates nearly all estates by
204 See GRAVELLE & MAGUtRE, supra note 15, at 19 (explaining how to transfer assets to charity
while still maintaining control over their distribution); see also Waldeck, supra note 72, at 689
(contrasting private foundations with public charities).
205 See BASS & IRONS, supra note 110, at 3 (discussing the impact of a decrease in giving to
foundations). Private foundations are exempt from income tax, so their gifts can be invested and increase
tax-free. I.R.C. § 509(a).
206 BASS & IRONS, supra note 110, at 7.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 2 (citing IRS data that shows that because a significant portion of foundation assets come
from estate revenues, especially large estates, repeal of the estate tax would have a large impact on
foundations and their charitable works).
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raising the exemption level too high would cause billions to be
209lost to charity.
It is without doubt that charitable giving is sensitive to estate tax rates. The
current encouragement to give to charities at death and in life will no longer
exist, and gifts and bequests will decline. Charities will be hit from three
angles: less money from charitable bequests, fewer funds from private
foundation funding, and a decrease in federal revenue available for support.
Without the revenues derived directly or indirectly from the tax, charities
will be forced to rely on the government for revenue or will be shut down
from lack of funding. While it is the wealthy who advocate for such a move,
it is the poor, and others who rely on these charities, that will be most
seriously affected.
IV. How Repeal Will Unfairly Impact Blacks
A. Wealth Inequality
Blacks are more likely than whites to be poor, as evidenced by the
vast disparities in wealth between the two groups.2 0 The proposed estate tax
repeal benefits the wealthy at the expense of the poor. The result: the repeal
of the estate tax will negatively and disproportionately affect black
minorities. Only the richest individuals in the country would benefit from
211the repeal, a group that is white by a margin of more than ten to one.
Further, the lost revenue to the government would have to be recovered from
other sources. The government would most likely recoup lost revenue by
imposing additional taxes212 and by making cuts to domestic programs. In
taking compensative measures that will affect all income levels of the
population, the government would burden a much larger population of blacks
than the selective estate tax affects. Repeal would result in even less federal
revenue for important government programs that are already under-funded.
Such programs include: enforcing civil rights; providing disadvantaged
children with child-care and preschool programs; funding job training
programs, housing, or drug and alcohol treatment programs; financing the
209 INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 135, at 1.
210 See Overton, supra note 59, at 1009 (discussing the disproportion in income and wealth
between white and black households); see also Keister & Moller, supra note 67, at 73 (using data to
indicate the correlation between race and wealth).
211 See Green, supra note 9, at 16 (arguing that repealing the estate tax would not help blacks
close the wealth gap); see also Keister, supra note 78, at 46 (noting that as of 1995, only 1% of the richest
Americans were black).
212 It is likely that the taxes that are increased in order to compensate for the lost revenue will be
taxes paid by all Americans, rich and poor alike, rather than just the wealthy.
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No Child Left Behind Act; and providing funds for loans to minorities or for
public subsidies of historically black colleges.213 Overall, eliminating the
estate tax would likely raise taxes for most blacks while simultaneously
decreasing government benefits.21 4 As Bill Gates, Sr., George Soros, and
Steven Rockefeller put it, "The billions of dollars in state and federal revenue
lost will inevitably be made up either by increasing taxes on those less able
to pay or by cutting Social Security, Medicare, environmental protection, and
many other government programs so important to our nation's continued
well-being."
215
Research has consistently shown that race affects wealth ownership,
regardless of income level.21 6 In 1995, the median income for blacks was
only 63 percent of the white median income.217 The median net worth in
white households was more than eight times larger, at $61,000, than in black
households, at $7,400.218 Further, in 1999, 23.6 percent of blacks lived in
poverty while only 7.7 percent of whites had similar financial conditions.219
In the same year, 15 percent of white households had a zero or negative net
worth compared with 31 percent of black households. 220 These differences
cannot be explained by inequalities in income alone. Even when black and
white families in the same income levels are compared, disparities exist.
221
For example, among families with annual incomes of $40,000, white families
have an average net worth of $80,000, while black families have a net worth
of half that, only $40,000.222 These numbers illustrate that individuals in the
black middle class continue to be asset-poor. While income can provide for
a home, food, and limited education, "wealth is the stuff that upward
mobility is made of. Equality of opportunity cannot be achieved under
unequal conditions (such as differential access to wealth)., 223  There are
many proposed explanations for the wide disparity in wealth, ranging from
educational differences to structural barriers and discrimination, to the lack
213 Bass et al., supra note 10.
214 See Green, supra note 9 (criticizing the viewpoint of wealthy black individuals, that the estate
tax will help blacks as a whole).
215 Gates et al., supra note 186, at P1.
216 See Keister & Moller, supra note 67, at 73 (using sociological research and empirical data to
indicate the correlation between race and wealth).
217 O',erton, supra note 59, at 1007-08 (stating that in 1995, median household income for whites
was $35,766 but only $22,393 for blacks).
218 Id. at 1009 (citing CHUCK COLLINS & FELICE YESKEL, UNITED FOR A FAIR ECONOMY,
ECONOMIC APARTHEID IN AMERICAN: A PRIMER ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY & INSECURITY 55 (2000)).
219 Overton, supra note 59, at 1011 (citing data from the 1999 U.S. Census Reports).
220 Id. at 1012.
221 See Dalton Conley, The Black-White Wealth Gap, THE NATION, Mar. 26, 2001, at 20,
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20010326/conley (discussing the disparities in wealth between
whites and blacks).
2 Id.
223 Id. at 21.
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224
of housing and occupational opportunities. Regardless of the primary
cause or causes of the racial gap in wealth, these differences "are bound to be
exacerbated across generations if most wealth is inherited.,
225
Inequalities such as these are a result, at least in part, of the "head
start" whites enjoyed in accumulating and passing on assets for centuries
while blacks were oppressed and enslaved, and their labor exploited to
produce wealth for whites. Wealth provides direct financial benefits, as well
as other advantages, such as home ownership, investment opportunities, and
emergency saving.226 The majority of wealth accumulation results from gifts
from previous generations.227 Yet blacks, facing constant obstacles and
discrimination that prevents them from accumulating wealth, have
historically been unable to pass on such wealth.228 Upon emancipation,
blacks found themselves without assets with which to begin their free lives.
Many were forced into sharecropping, which afforded them a minimal
income and no assets. 229 Escape from this institution was barred by "black
codes," astronomical licensing fees designed to keep blacks from acquiring
land or setting up businesses. Such barriers to the acquisition of property
persisted in the twentieth century, as black homeowners were denied loans
during the Great Depression (while the government freely provided such
loans for white homeowners), and Social Security systematically excluded
blacks, by exempting the service and agricultural sectors.23'
Even after the Depression and World War II, blacks were
systematically excluded from home ownership programs established by the
Federal Housing Authority because the loans distributed by the programs
224 See Keister & Moller, supra note 67, at 73 (attempting to explain the differences in wealth
between white and black households).
225 Id. at 76 (citing R.P. Clignet, Ethnicity and Inheritance, in INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN
AMERICA 119 (J. Robert, K. Miller, S.J. McNamee, ed.. 1998); M.L. OLIVER & T.M. SHAPIRO, BLACK
WEALTH/WHrrE WEALTH 152-56 (1995)); see also Overton, supra note 59, at 1006 ("Intergenerational
transfers of wealth have carried forward past racial disparities in wealth that arose directly from state-
sponsored discrimination.").
226 See Keister, supra note 78, at 44-45 (showing that wealth can be beneficial beyond simple
financial benefits).
227 See Repetti, supra note 63, at 856 ("Bequests and gifts account for approximately fifty percent
of all wealth accumulations in the Unites States.") (citing William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz,
Intergenerational Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth 1-2 (Inst. For Res. on Poverty Discussion,
Working Paper No. 1019-93, 1993); Laitner, supra note 95, at 2; see also Keister, supra note 78, at 45
(noting that wealth can be invested so that it generates even more wealth for future generations).
228 See Overton, supra note 59 at 1007 (explaining that wealth is derived from transfers other than
the transfer of assets-wealth can come from education, experiences, friendships, and contacts that a
parent provides a child); see also OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 225, at 51 (stating that "every
circumstance of bias and discrimination against blacks has produced a... positive gain for whites").
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were directed to the suburbs, while the majority of blacks lived in the
cities.232 Eventually efforts to help blacks acquire homes and property were
made, but simply providing blacks with the opportunity or even the means to
become homeowners has not been enough. 233 "White flight" causes housing
values in black neighborhoods to decline.2a4 Without the ability to
accumulate property and assets, blacks have been, and continue to be, far
behind whites in their ability to pass assets from generation to generation,
making an estate tax repeal essentially worthless for most minority families.
Studies have consistently shown a strong correlation between wealth
and education: those who are raised in poor households are more likely to
have fewer years of education and to perform worse on tests.235 Further,
these trends are likely to perpetuate through generations.236 The reasons for
this are obvious and widespread: money can buy better tutoring, teachers,
SAT courses, and higher education. 7  Without the capital to pay for these
resources, blacks will face much greater difficulties in attaining higher levels
of education and the accompanying wealth.238  Blacks are more likely to
receive financial aid than whites and are awarded larger grants than their
239white counterparts. Scholarships and grants are one of the primary ways
232 Id.
233 Id. In 2002, 71.8% of whites owned their own homes, while only 47.3% of blacks were
homeowners. U.S. Census Bureau, Moving to America - Moving to Homeownership: 1994 to 2002, Table
7, Sept. 2003, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/movingtoamerica2OO2/tab7.html.
234 Conley, supra note 221, at 22.
235 See Repetti, supra note 63, at 838 (noting studies that show correlations between wealth and
education) (citing BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOtT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 160 (1999)).
236 Id. at 838-39; see also Keister & Moller, supra note 67, at 75 ("Early studies of mobility
concluded that poverty, and thus wealth as well, was transmitted from parents to their children, typically
via education." (citing PETER F.D. BLAU & OTIS D. DUNCAN, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL
STRUCTURE (1967); J.W. Graham, Black-White Differences in Wealth and Asset Composition, 105 QJ.
ECON. 321-39 (1990)).
237 See Repetti, supra note 63, at 838 (positing reasons for the results of studies on wealth and
education) (citing BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTr, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 160 (1999)); see
also Keister, supra note 78, at 45 ("[AII wealth expands the educational and occupational advantages of
the next generation.").
238 See Peter Tolsdorf, If Separate, Then at Least Equal: Rethinking Brown v. Board of Education
and De Facto Public School Segregation, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 680 (2005) (finding that despite
similar graduation rates between whites and blacks, large educational performance disparities exist).
While states no longer segregate schools, other factors, including wealth create the same result, preventing
blacks from attaining the same educational experience and benefits as whites. Id. at 668. "Inequality in
American public education is pervasive. Suburban white children generally attend the best schools, while
inner-city minorities attend the worst." Id. at 680.
239 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, 1999-
2000 NATIONAL POSTSECONDARY STUDENT AID STUDY: PERCENT OF UNDERGRADUATES RECEIVING
PELL GRANTS AND AVERAGE PELL GRANT TOTAL FOR THOSE WHO RECEIVED, BY RACE/ETHNICrrY AND
SECTOR: 1999-2000 (2000), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/das/library/tables-istings/show-nedrc.asprt=p&tableID=319. Data indicates that at
public four-year institutions, 45.3% of blacks receive Pell Grants, averaged at $2245 each, while 17.9% of
whites receive grants averaging $1891. At private four-year institutions, 37.4% of blacks receive Pell
Grants, averaged at $2046 each, while 16.8% of whites receive grants averaging $1807.
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in which blacks can beat the disadvantages they face in education. However,
if charitable giving is reduced by repeal of the estate tax, universities will
receive less money to create scholarships and provide financial aid.
Therefore, estate tax repeal will not only increase wealth inequality directly,
but also indirectly by decreasing education funds that could help close the
gap.
The estate tax is misunderstood to have large effects on small
businesses and farms owned by blacks. In fact, very few small businesses or
farmers are even subject to the tax in the firstplace, and an even smaller
amount of those are owned by black taxpayers.240 Further, the tax code was
amended in 1997 to protect farms and small businesses. Therefore, the
argument of those who oppose the estate tax because of claims that it
destroys farms and small businesses is unfounded.
241
Repealing the estate tax will only benefit those very few minority
individuals who are already rich. Even if these individuals contribute large
amounts of their own earnings and assets to help other less fortunate
members of their race, it cannot possibly make up for the billions in
charitable donations that will be lost with repeal. Nor is it proven that
individuals in this category, such as Bob Johnson and Oprah Winfrey, would
continue to give to poorer individuals of their race if the incentive to give
were eliminated by estate tax repeal. Admittedly, it is highly unlikely that
they would cease or decrease their giving to these individuals, but it is an
open possibility.
Some may argue that wealthy individuals tend to make charitable
contributions to organizations like private educational institutions, museums,
and public television, and therefore their contributions do not help blacks.242
While this may be true, it is not enough to justify the effects that will occur
with permanent repeal. The effect of the repeal on government revenues will
have larger repercussions for poor individuals, and thus many minority
240 See Green, supra note 9, at 16 ("As a result, only 2 percent of estate-tax revenue collected [in
2000] came from these sources, a tiny fraction of which came from blacks."); see also GRAETZ &
SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 215 (pointing out that the majority of estates have enough liquid assets to pay
the estate tax, and small businesses and farms are only a small part of the tax's financial contributors);
GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 13 (stating that estates whose farm assets accounted for half of
the gross estate accounted for only 1.4% of taxable estates, while returns with business assets equal to half
of the estate accounted for only 1.6% of taxable estates).
241 See GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 14 (concluding that studies indicate that no more
than a percent of heirs or business owners would be at risk of losing the business or farm in order to pay
estate taxes).
242 See Todd Izzo, A Full Spectrum of Light: Rethinking the Charitable Contribution Deduction,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 2371, 2391 (1993) (discussing studies that reported the recipients of wealthy charitable
giving).
13 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2006)
243individuals. Because most charities rely heavily on government money,
cuts in revenue will have a large effect on the programs such charities will be
able to support. In addition, many will argue that, regardless of the
charitable contributions made by the wealthy, middle and lower class
individuals tend to support charities that are more likely to aid them. 244 Since
their contributions are not driven by estate tax created incentives, permanent
repeal will not affect the charitable contributions to the charities that most
benefit low- and middle-income blacks. This argument, however, fails to
recognize that the government revenues that will be lost if the estate tax
repeal is made permanent will probably be made up by the imposition of
other taxes, most likely taxes that will affect all Americans.245 Therefore,
with repeal, these individuals will have less income with which to give
charitable contributions, and their charitable giving will decrease
simultaneously with the decrease in incentive for the wealthy to contribute.
If the goal is to provide opportunity for blacks, it would be more
efficient to provide funds to allow blacks to start their own businesses, or to
help them gain the schooling and resources they need to advance in society.
The repeal of the estate tax will only eliminate funds that could further these
causes. Instead of relieving the wealthy of taxes they can afford to pay, the
government should use these funds for programs designed to target the asset-
poor, which would inevitably favor blacks.246 Such action will further the
policy behind the estate tax, breaking up concentrated wealth, and filtering it
down to the lower classes in society.
B. Current Support for Repeal by Blacks is Based on Misinformation
As supporters of the estate tax repeal began to seek groups to rally
behind them and press for repeal, an unlikely group came to the forefront,
shocking political analysts, economists, and politicians. Black minority
243 See Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped Potential
of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325, 328 (1997) ("Charitable
organizations deliver a significant amount of governmentally funded social benefits.").
2" See id. at 344 (stating that a majority of low-income taxpayers donate to mutual aid
associations). For example, many poor blacks tend to give to religious groups and small churches. This
type of reciprocal giving is such that "low-income taxpayers donate to religious institutions and social-
welfare organizations because they view those organizations as more likely to respond to their needs."
Izzo, supra note 242, at 2391.
245 See supra notes 212, 2134 and accompanying text (stating that it is likely that tax increases to
compensate for lost revenue will affect all Americans, rich and poor alike).
246 See Conley, supra note 221 (noting that blacks have disproportionately less wealth than
whites); see also Keister, supra note 78, at 46 ("Disparities in wealth ownership among racial groups are
among the most extreme and persistent forms of inequality in the United States.").
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individuals have been encouraged to support the proposal for repeal. 247
Why, many questioned, would black minorities-those least affected by the
estate tax and most likely to be severely affected by its repeal-rally for
permanent elimination? The answer lay in the manner in which politicians in
favor of repeal framed the issue for presentation to the public.
When the movement for estate tax repeal began, a single man took
the stage and united poor and wealthy minorities alike. His name was
Charles Thigpen, and he was an eighty-three year old black tree farmer from
Montrose, Mississippi, the grandchild of slaves. Testifying before the Ways
and Means Committee, he spoke about the tree farm he had spent his life
building, the legacy he wanted to pass on to his children.2 48 He claimed that
his desire was threatened, a dream that the estate tax would make impossible.
All his assets were tied up in the farm, and when he died, he claimed, his
estate would have to sell the farm in order to pay his estate taxes. As a
result, his dream, his lifework, would die.
Repeal advocates grabbed hold of this testimony, the heart-
wrenching story of a hard-working and self-made man, relating his story to
the media and using it to rally unlikely minority support behind the repeal.
However, the Thigpen story was highly exaggerated. 9 In fact, the Thigpen
estate would not be subject to taxation, as the value of its assets would not
exceed the tax exemption amount. Indeed, as scholars Michael J. Graetz and
Ian Shapiro suspect, "[It [was] far more likely that an astute Washingtonian
hand penned Chester's testimony .... [He] was a perfect poster child for the
campaign [against repeal,] . . .a front for the wealthy white families who
were financing the repeal machine., 250 It worked nonetheless. Not only did
black small business and farm owners rally behind the repeal movement with
full support and encouragement from the Black Chamber of Commerce, but
poor blacks did as well. These hopeful minority members followed the lead
of those who had achieved what every poor black American hopes to one day
achieve, living out the American Dream, and these minority success stories
claimed that the estate tax threatened to take it all away. It is of little surprise
that the poor and hopeful members of the black minority jumped on the
bandwagon. The repeal campaign "successfully spread the message that the
death tax was a key issue for minority voters, '251 even though in reality it
247 See, e.g., Alford, supra note 9 (discussing why, as President of the NBCC, he backs the move
for repeal and encourages other blacks to join in his support); see also Green, supra note 9 (noting the
advertisements run by estate tax supporters in newspapers, claiming the tax discriminates against blacks
and urging its repeal).
248 See GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 62-63 (relaying Chester Thigpen's testimony before
the House Ways and Means Committee).
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 7 1.
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would never affect those who heard the message. As one member of
Congress put it, "Where I am from, no one will ever be subject to the estate
tax, but [when] I say, 'I'll get rid of the death tax to protect you, your
families, your farms' ... I get cheers.
252
Wealthy black individuals, like Black Entertainment Television
(BET) CEO Robert Johnson,253 have been strong advocates for the repeal of
the estate tax, claiming that as black millionaires they have had to work
especially hard for the money they have earned and should not be required to
give it to the government upon their death. The National Black Chamber of
Commerce has argued that "[g]etting rid of the 'death tax' will start to create
a needed legacy and begin a cycle of wealth-building for Blacks in this
country."254 What these individuals fail to consider is the vast implications
of their protests. While wealthy black individuals make up a small
percentage of the those who must pay estate taxes (less than one-half of one
percent), 55 all Americans will feel the effect of repeal in some manner or
another, and the majority of the black population will be faced with
additional hurdles to attaining the status of their millionaire counterparts.
The politicians who will make the ultimate decision regarding repeal
are also misinformed about where the public stands on the issue. "About a
hundred members of Congress are multimillionaires, people who move in
wealthy circles .... [T]hey have a slanted perspective. Whom they talk to
and what they hear greatly exaggerates the intensity of public opinion on the
issue., 256 Congressmen, as discussed above, are at the mercy of the wealthy.
The wealthy fund their campaigns and throw their political weight behind
politicians when needed.257 Congressmen can be viewed as puppets, with the
wealthy holding the strings, and these elite puppeteers have clamored for
repeal. Politicians have no choice but to listen. In addition, the voices of the
wealthy are joined by black minorities, whose support is misinformed.
Misinformation may cause politicians to see support for repeal as a win-win
situation.
252 See id. at 78 (quoting a "member of Congress").
23 See BET's Black Billionaire Trojan Horse: "Democrat" Bob Johnson Fronts for GOP, THE
BLACK COMMENTATOR, Oct. 3, 2003, http://www.blackcommentator.com13_thw.html [hereinafter The
Black Commentator] (citing Bob Johnson as one of the forerunners of the move for estate tax repeal by
blacks). Bob Johnson represents one-half of America's black billionaires. Oprah Winfrey is the only
other black billionaire to date. Id.
254 Alford, supra note 9.
255 See THE BLACK COMMENTATOR, supra note 253 (arguing that Bob Johnson has abandoned his
race, angling to relieve a few tens of thousands of blacks from the estate tax, while providing the same
service to over two million whites in the process).
26 GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 241.
257 See Alexander, supra note 83, at 244 (stating that "the wealthy have special access and
influence; power is concentrated in the hands of the few who control money. After the campaigns, the
wealthy wield inordinate power, enjoying access to elected officials that others do not.").
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V. What Should Be Done?
The primary argument against the estate tax is that it punishes those
who have worked hard to attain the American dream. These individuals have
strived to achieve, and they have amassed enough wealth to exceed the estate
tax exemption, even if by a small amount, meaning the government will take
away a large part of what they have spent their lives accumulating. The
estate tax, they argue, prevents new individuals from ever breaking into the
wealthiest class of society by collecting so much of the estate in taxes that
only a small proportion of the estate, if any, can be passed on. This
argument is especially strong from the point of view of small but successful
business and farm owners. These individuals claim that because all of their
assets are tied up in their property, their heirs are forced to liquidate these
assets by selling the business or farm in order to have the funds to pay for the
estate tax, preventing the decedent from passing on his farm or business.
There is, however, a medium ground that will continue to tax the
wealthy who can afford to and should pay the tax, while exempting those
who really cannot pay it without ruining their ability to pass assets to the
next generation. This compromise will still generate enough revenue for the
government to prevent the decrease in funding of programs and benefits to
the poor.
This Note proposes that the estate tax be retained, but with a high
exemption amount. Under this structure, the estate tax would exempt most
taxpayers, but would continue to tax those few ultra-wealthy individuals who
contribute the most to the estate tax revenue. As previously stated, by the
time the exemption reaches the $3.5 million mark in 2009, only 3 in 1000
decedents will be subject to the tax.258 Similarly, of the estate taxes
collected, approximately two-thirds come from liquid assets rather than
businesses and farms. 259 At this level, small business and farm owners, as
well as others who strived to make their assets reach the million dollar mark
in assets, and the minorities who are only beginning to accumulate wealth
will be exempt from the tax. However, since the majority of estate tax
revenues are derived from those whose estates are far above the exemption
258 Burman et al., supra note 104, at 3; see also INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 135 ("[I]f the
estate tax is retained at its 2009 levels, only 0.3 percent of all persons who die that year would be subject
to the tax..").
29 See GRAEZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 215 (pointing out that the majority of estates have
enough liquid assets to pay the estate tax, and small businesses and farms are only a small part of the tax's
financial contributors); see also GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 16 (stating that estates whose
farm assets accounted for half of the gross estate accounted for only 1.4% of taxable estates, while returns
with business assets equal to half of the estate accounted for only 1.6% of taxable estates).
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amount,260 even when set at $3.5 million, government revenues, charitable
bequests, and programs funding benefits for the poor will suffer far less than
with permanent repeal. 6' Setting the exemption amount at $3.5 million will
sharply curtail the number of estates subject to the estate tax by 84 percent,
but would maintain 44 percent of the revenue, as opposed to 0 percent if the
estate tax were repealed. 62 In short, only those who are really rich, those
who have the most ability to contribute, 3 out of 1000 decedents, will be
subject to the estate tax.
Empirical evidence supports this proposal on various grounds. In
2000, the Congressional Budget Office conducted a study to determine the
effect of simply raising the estate tax exemption by looking at how
households in 2000 would have changed their charitable bequests if the
estate tax exemption were set at $3.5 million instead of the scheduled level
of $625,000 for that year.263 The results indicate that charitable contributions
and bequests would have decreased by less than 3 percent.2 4 Further, in
2000, only 5.3 percent of taxable estate tax returns filed contained farm
assets, a total of 2765 out of 52,000 total returns.265 The exemption that year
was $625,000; if it had been higher, $5 million for example, only 0.5 percent
of estate tax returns would have been composed of farm assets. 66 A similar
result would have been reached for small businesses. In 2001, small
businesses composed approximately 12 percent of total taxable returns, but
the large majority of small business owners would not have been liable for
the tax if the exemption amount were set at $5 million, taxing only 1663 out
of 6186 estates. Overall, exempting farms and small businesses
completely from the estate tax would cost only a small percentage of the
revenues lost with full repeal.268
Theodore Roosevelt's call for equality of opportunity, the
progressivity of the tax system, and the distribution, rather than
concentration, of wealth 269 can all be realized without cutting into the hard-
260 Burman et al., supra note 104, at 2; see also GRAVELLE & MAGUIRE, supra note 15, at 106
(noting that estates over $5 million accounted for 51% of estate tax revenues in 2004).
261 JOEL FRIEDMAN & RUTH CARLrIz, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, ESTATE TAX
REFORM COULD RAISE MUCH NEEDED REVENUE: SOME REFORM OPTIONS WITH Low TAX RATES RAISE
VERY LITrLE REVENUE (2005), http://www.cbpp.org/3-16-05tax.htm.
262 Id.
263 MCCLELLAND & GREENE, supra note 163, at 9.5.
264 See id. at 8. This is as compared to a decrease of 6 to 12% if the estate tax were repealed
entirely in 2000.
265 GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 215.
266 id.
267 Id.
268 See id. (concluding that if the exemption amount were set at a high level, opposition to the
estate tax based on its effects on small businesses and farms would diminish).
269 See Waldeck, supra note 72, at 676-77 (citing RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH AND
SOCIETY 60 (1982) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt's speech at the House of Representatives Office Site on
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earned assets of those who manage to accumulate a significant estate through
hard work and exertion. Setting a high exemption amount will continue to
tax the exceptionally wealthy individuals who simply pass wealth from
generation to generation. It will help to reduce concentrations of wealth and
decrease the disparities that exist between economic classes. The nation's
democratic ideal will be furthered without sacrificing the aid the poorer
classes so desperately need.
VI. Conclusion
Empirical evidence has conclusively shown the repeal of the estate
tax has very few pros and many cons. Repeal of the estate tax will create a
domino effect that will lead to greater wealth inequality between whites and
blacks. Repeal will create a result that is the polar opposite of what our
nation strives for; it is a direct assault on equality. Federal and state
government revenues will fall, decreasing the funding available to the poor, a
group that is largely composed of black minority members of society. Other
taxes will have to be raised to account for the lost revenue, most likely taxes
that will fall on all Americans, not just the wealthy as does the estate tax.
Additional taxes for lower-income individuals, who are disproportionately
black, will mean less available income and fewer charitable contributions to
organizations designed to directly benefit their population. Wealthy
charitable bequests will plummet, leaving less money for programs that have
the ability to help close the gap between whites and blacks that has persisted
for centuries. The progressivity of the nation's tax system will be dealt a
powerful blow, relieving the rich of the estate tax while putting the burden
on the poor to make up for the decrease in tax revenues. All of these effects
will increase the widening wealth difference between the wealthy and the
poor, and ultimately white and black.
Only those who can actually afford to pay the tax in the first place-
no easy task with a current exemption amount of $2 million-will benefit
from a repeal of the estate tax. So why has the repeal become such a hot
button issue, with surprising support from black minority individuals, those
most likely to be negatively affected by repeal? Because taxes are
considered to be inherently evil by the average taxpayer.270  A tax that is
imposed when a person dies and can no longer benefit from the government
Apr. 14, 1906 and discussing Roosevelt's first suggestion of an inheritance tax in 1906 "so framed as to
put it out of the power of the owner of one of these enormous fortunes to hand more than certain amount
to any one individual").
270 See MOODY ET AL., supra note 4 (noting that the increasing complexity of the tax code has
made the cost of compliance increase); see also SHLAES, supra note 4 (discussing public opinion
regarding taxes in the context of withholding).
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seems especially unfair. Simply put, the American public has been provided
misinformation, with the largest effect on the black population receiving it.
In their case, the misunderstanding of the estate tax and the effects of repeal
has led them to support a measure that will hurt them. "Death is the great
leveler. Everyone knows they could be struck down tomorrow. By calling
the tax the 'death tax' and placing the undertaker and the tax collector side-
by-side, the [estate tax supporters] made the IRS look like the avaricious
beneficiary of personal tragedy. Even the travails of the very wealthy [take]
on a universal hue. ' '27 1 The American ideal encourages both white and black
individuals of all income levels to believe that they can attain wealthy status
if they work hard. Thousands of books like The Millionaire Next Door
provide detailed instructions for accumulating wealth and assert that anyone
can become a millionaire.272 In short, like others in lower income brackets,
by opposing the estate tax, blacks are protecting the possibility that they too
may have wealth to preserve at their deaths. What is overlooked, however, is
that repeal of the estate tax now will only make it disproportionately harder
for them to achieve such a status in the future, as the governmental aid and
private programs designed to help them will likely be eliminated.
The issue has been framed to garner support it should not possess,
deceptively implying that society is behind the move for repeal. If the truth
were widely known, the issue would never have hit the agenda. Equality of
economic opportunity is central to this nation's democratic ideal. The
government should not provide benefits to the rich at the expense of the
poor. As Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said in 1941, "We can have
a democratic society or we can have great concentrated wealth in the hands
of a few. We cannot have both., 273 Because the black minority makes up a
disproportionate percentage of the nation's poor, a repeal that will place
disadvantages on the poor will disproportionately affect black minorities.
The recent rhetoric in support of repeal, urging blacks to take a stand against
the estate tax, fails to warn them of the realistic and damaging consequences
of repeal. Instead of saying, "Kill the death tax," blacks should be crying,
"Long live the estate tax!"
271 GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 5, at 232.
272 THOMAS J. STANLEY & WILLIAM D. DANKO, THE MILLIONAIRE NEXT DOOR (1996).
273 Keister, supra note 78, at 45.
